In order to improve mobile data transparency, a number of network-based approaches have been proposed to inspect packets generated by mobile devices and detect personally identifiable information (PII), ad requests, or other activities. State-of-the-art approaches train classifiers based on features extracted from HTTP packets. So far, these classifiers have only been trained in a centralized way, where mobile users label and upload their packet logs to a central server, which then trains a global classifier and shares it with the users to apply on their devices. However, packet logs used as training data may contain sensitive information that users may not want to share/upload. In this paper, we apply, for the first time, a Federated Learning approach to mobile packet classification, which allows mobile devices to collaborate and train a global model, without sharing raw training data. Methodological challenges we address in this context include: model and feature selection, and tuning the Federated Learning parameters. We apply our framework to two different packet classification tasks (i.e., to predict PII exposure or ad requests in HTTP packets) and we demonstrate its effectiveness in terms of classification performance, communication and computation cost, using three real-world datasets.
INTRODUCTION
There is recently increased public awareness and concern about how sensitive information available on mobile devices is shared and tracked. In particular, mobile apps and third party libraries (including developer, tracking and advertising libraries) routinely send such information (i.e., personally identifiable information or "PII", sensory data, user activity) to remote servers, typically without the user being aware or in control of this information flow. Some steps are being taken to increase mobile, and more generally online, data transparency on the legal side (EU GDPR [1] , CCPA [2], COPPA [3] ) as well as on the technical side, including approaches like permissions [4, 5, 6, 7] , static and dynamic approaches [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15] , and network-based approaches [16, 17, 18] .
In this paper, we focus on network-based approaches that inspect packets transmitted out of mobile devices in order to detect PII, tracking, ad requests, malware or other activities; an example is depicted on Fig. 2 . This information can then be used to take action (e.g., block outgoing packets), to inform the user or for measurement studies. Early approaches (such as Haystack/Lumen [19, 20] and AntMonitor [21, 22, 23] ) performed deep packet inspection (DPI) and string matching to find PII. Mobile browsers [24] use manually-curated filter-lists (such as EasyList [25] , hpHosts [26] , and AdAway [27] ) to match URI and other information and block ad requests.
Machine learning approaches have been recently proposed to predict PII (e.g., Recon [16] and AntShield [28, 17] ) or ad requests (NoMoAds [18] ) in outgoing packets, based on features extracted from HTTP requests. These classifiers are trained using labeled packet traces, obtained either through manual/automatic testing of apps, or by devices labeling packets from real user activity to contribute them to a server. However, training has only been done in a Centralized way so far.
Consider the scenario and options presented on Fig. 1 . In the Local approach ( Fig. 1(a) ), mobile users could label packets on their device, train and apply their own classifier locally. In this case, users do not share any information with untrusted servers or other users, thus preserving their privacy. However, they do not benefit from the global training data that is available on a large number of devices either. In the Centralized approach ( Fig. 1(b) ), mobile users label and upload their packet logs to a central server, which then trains a global classifier and shares it with all users to apply on their devices. However, packet traces labeled with PII, tracking and advertising, contain sensitive information that users may not want to share with a server or other users. In this paper, we propose Federated Mobile Packet Classification, which combines the best of both worlds: it allows mobile devices to collectively train a global model, without sharing their raw training data that may contain sensitive information (in the label, features, or any part of the HTTP packet).
The Federated Learning framework was proposed in [29, Figure 2: Example of an outgoing HTTP packet, sent from an app on the mobile device to a remote server. The URI field alone reveals a lot of information, including various identifiers, referred domain, location and other parameters that can be used for fingerprinting and tracking users.
30], to collaboratively train models for mobile devices without sharing raw training data. An overview is depicted on Fig. 1(c) . The main idea is that mobile devices train a local model, and send only model parameters to the server, instead of the raw training data; the server aggregates the information from all users, and sends the updated parameters of the global model to all devices, and the process repeats until convergence. In this paper, we apply Federated Learning to classify outgoing HTTP packets w.r.t. two specific tasks, namely predicting whether an outgoing packet contains (1) a PII (which we refer to as PII exposure) or (2) an Ad request (which typically results in an ad being served in the HTTP response). Methodological challenges we had to address in order to apply Federated Learning to packet classification include: model and feature selection, and tuning the Federated Learning parameters. We also evaluated our methodology using three real-world datasets and showed that it achieves high classification F1 score for both classification tasks (PII exposure and Ad Request), with minimal computation and communication cost. This paper makes the following three contributions.
1. Feature Space for HTTP packets. We propose a feature space based on HTTP features that performs well for both classification tasks (since PII exposure and Ad requests use the same fields to profile users), while protecting sensitive information and reducing the feature space. First, we observe that not only training data, but also features can expose sensitive information; e.g., that would be the case if some of the PII shown on Fig. 2 were selected as features. Therefore, we use only HTTP Keys as features from an HTTP packet, (i) keys from URI and Cookie fields (ii) custom HTTP headers and (iii) the presence of a file request. We purposely do not use neither destination domains or hostnames, nor any information from the URI path (which could be sensitive itself if a user visits a sensitive website with i.e., political, medical or religious content) but only the keys mentioned above. Prior work such as Recon [16] and NoMoAds [18] used all the words from the HTTP packets after discarding the most frequent ones and the rarest ones. Our choice of features not only minimizes the sharing of sensitive information, but also reduces the number of parameters that need to be updated. Second, we observe that the size of the feature space depends on the mobile apps and third-party libraries. For example, Webview apps can access any domain, which leads to an explosion of feature space size and wide variation across users; in contrast, non-Webview apps have a limited API and result in a small feature space, which is the same across different users.
2. Model Selection: Federated SVM. State-of-the-art classifiers for mobile packet classification have typically trained Decision Trees (DT) to predict PII exposure (Recon [16] ) or Ad requests (NoMoAds [18] ) based on features extracted from HTTP packets. DT were chosen by prior work primarily for two reasons: (i) their good classification performance and (ii) their interpretability (nodes in the trees are intuitive rules). Unfortunately, DT do not naturally lend themselves to federation, which has been developed for models based on Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD), primarily for Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) [29, 30] . In this paper, we propose Federated SVM as the core of the federated packet classification framework. We show that (i) Support Vector Machine (SVM) performs similarly to DT for our problem, (ii) Federated SVM achieves similar F1 score to Centralized SVM, within few communication rounds and with low computation cost per user, and (iii) SVM can be as interpretable as DT and we also discuss knowledge transfer between the two.
3. Evaluation using three real-world datasets and two classification tasks. To evaluate our framework, we used different datasets: the publicly available NoMoAds for Ad requests [18, 31] and AntShield for PII exposures [28, 32] ; and our in-house datasets with real users. For the first two datasets, we create synthetic users by splitting the data evenly or unevenly, and we evaluate how it affects Federated Learning. We compare Federated to Centralized and Local approaches w.r.t. to the classification performance, communication rounds and computation. We show that the Federated models are superior to Local models and comparable to their corresponding Centralized models, without requiring too many communication rounds or too much computation per client in order to achieve an F1 score above 0.90 for PII and above 0.84 for Ad request prediction. We also demonstrate the benefit of crowdsourcing: a relatively small number of users is sufficient to train a good Federated model that generalizes well to most users.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related work. Section 3 presents our methodology for federated packet classification. Section 4 describes the datasets used for evaluation. Section 5 presents results for various scenarios and provides insights along the way. Section 6 concludes the paper and discusses directions for future work.
RELATED WORK
Performance measurements from mobile devices have captured the interest of many researchers over the years [33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39] . There is also increasing interest in understanding and controlling PII exposure and user tracking on mobile devices. Some proposed approaches include: permissions [4, 5, 6, 7] , static analysis [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] , dynamic analysis [14, 15] , and network-based approaches [40, 41, 42] ; our work falls within the latter.
Interception of Mobile Traffic. Network-based approaches inspect mobile traffic for PII exposure, or other information of interest, such as tracking, malware, advertising. State-of-the-art tools include Haystack/Lumen [19, 20, 43] , Antmonitor [44, 23, 22] . Lumen and Antmonitor use string matching to detect PII in outgoing packets sent from various apps to remote destinations. The interception of mobile traffic is not part of our contribution but it is orthogonal to our approach.
PII and Ad Detection via Blacklists. There are many approaches based on manually curated blacklists [25, 26, 27] of domains on which they decide to block the whole packet destined to such domains or cookies from such domains [45] . Since blacklists are hard to maintain due to the ever-changing advertising ecosystem, there are many efforts to update such blacklists with additional graph analysis [46] , or with machine learning [47, 48, 49, 18] .
Machine Learning-Based PII and Ad Detection. Recon [16] and AntShield [17] are machine learning approaches to detect PII exposure in outgoing HTTP packets: they train (offline, and in a centralized fashion) per-app/domain Decision Trees to detect PII exposures, based on features extracted from HTTP packets. NoMoAds [18] is state-of-the-art approach for detecting Ad requests by enhancing blacklists via machine learning. We build on top of these ML approaches to introduce mobile packet classification learning in a distributed way. A step towards a more privacy-preserving PII detection on mobile devices is PrivacyProxy [50] , which processes user data locally and sends only hashed data to a server. One of its limitations is the cold start problem: it has to wait for enough data to be collected from other users in order to detect PII. MobiPurpose [51] uses the keys only from network requests from apps, in addition to app metadata and domain information, to classify the reason of PII exposure based on predefined candidates (i.e., advertising, geo-tagging, etc.). All these approaches are Centralized, as they do not consider collaboration between users to leverage diverse app usage behaviors that can generate PII or Ad requests. We would like to note that our federated mobile classification approach can be used towards predicting other tasks, i.e., fingerprinting detection [52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 40] assuming the availability of a corresponding per-packet labeled dataset. In this work, we focus on two classification tasks: PII exposure and Ad request detection because of the availability of labeled datasets that support these per-packet classification tasks.
Distributed Learning. The authors in [28] showed that systematic crowdsourcing where users collaborate with each other via data sharing helped to train better classifiers to detect PII exposures. However, it is assumed that users are willing to share their raw local data with a server and other users, which poses privacy risks. In order to leverage crowdsourcing in a more privacy-preserving way, we considered two approaches to enable collaborative training of a global model from several mobile devices: Federated Learning (which is our focus in this paper) and Private Aggregation with Teacher Ensembles (PATE) [57] . PATE trains a public Student model on labeled public data via a Teacher model trained on private data. In our problem, devices could train the Teacher, and public data could be datasets that have been made available by the research community or online communities, including those used in this paper [31, 32] . However, such public datasets do not necessarily capture all diverse patterns from apps, since they are produced via manual testing or automatic scripts that do not represent real users' app usage. Hence, we chose Federated Learning for our framework and problem space.
Federated Learning. An early version was proposed in [58] , where users trained models locally and shared the Stochastic Gradient Descent updates of certain parameters with a server, which then updated the global model. However [58] had no averaging mechanism and the evaluation was limited. The papers that coined the term "Federated Learning" were introduced in [29, 30] , in order to train text and image classifiers using training data available on a large number of mobile devices. The idea is that devices train SGD-based classifiers based on their local data and send updates (model parameters) to a trusted server, which aggregates them to up-date a global model. The main advantage of this approach is that the raw training data does not leave the device and thus, it is more privacy-preserving than a centralized model. A secondary advantage is that exchanging model parameters requires less communication (assuming fast convergence) than exchanging the raw training data, but this communication saving comes at some computational cost imposed on the devices to train models locally. Subsequent papers introduced optimizations in terms of communication efficiency, scalability and convergence [59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66] , or optimization in client selection [67] .
In contrast to related work in the field that is using image classification or next word prediction via word and character embeddings [29] , we focus on a problem where pre-trained word embeddings (such as Word2Vec [68]) are not applicable due to non-dictionary words present in HTTP packets. We apply Federated Learning in a setting where shallow models' (such as SVMs) performance is comparable to stateof-the-art methods, this means that specialized deep learning model architectures (such as Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) or Long Short-Term Memory (LSTMs) [29] ) are unnecessary.
Privacy and Federated Learning. Several security and privacy attacks are known for machine learning systems; e.g., [69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74] which include membership inference attacks, model inversion/extraction in ML models, poisoning the Federated model via malicious clients [75, 76] , malicious server [77] or training a backdoor task in addition to the main task in order to perform model replacement [78] . Although Federated Learning protects the raw training data of each device and shares only model parameter updates, these updates (or even the features of the model [79] ) may themselves leak information, due to privacy vulnerabilities of stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [80] . To prevent privacy attacks, additional mechanisms have been proposed on top of Federated Learning, most notably, Secure Aggregation based on secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) [81] or Differential Privacy [82] to offer privacy guarantees [83, 84, 85, 86] or both [87] . In this paper, we consider such variants of Federated Learning, as orthogonal and out of scope. Our focus in this paper is on the basic Federated Learning framework; how to adapt and evaluate it specifically for the task of mobile packet classification (as opposed to the image and text classification that is most commonly used for). The aforementioned attack scenarios in case of federated packet classification are deferred for future work.
METHODOLOGY

Problem Setup
Goal. We aim to train classifiers that use features extracted from HTTP requests coming out of mobile devices, to predict whether those packets contain information of interest, such as a PII exposure or Ad request. 1 In order to train 1 Being able to classify packets enables further action such as blocksuch classifiers, we need training data, i.e., packet traces and labels indicating whether a packet contains the information of interest. We assume that training data are crowdsourced, i.e., obtained and labeled on mobile devices and sent to a server that aggregates them and trains classifiers 2 . We also assume that the devices do not trust the server or other devices but they do want to contribute to the training and use the resulting global classifier. Our goal is to provide a methodology that enables devices to collaborate in training global classifiers, while avoiding to upload raw training data or even sensitive features to the server.
Federated Learning Approach. To achieve this goal, we apply the Federated Learning framework (depicted on Fig.  1 (c) and described in Section 2) for the first time to the problem of mobile packet classification. This requires addressing several challenges and making design choices and optimizations, specific to our context, such as the following.
Q1. What packet features can best predict the labels of interest (i.e., PII exposure or Ad request) in a packet? Section 3.2 discusses how we select HTTP Keys features from HTTP packets, to achieve high classification performance while also meeting privacy and other constraints.
Q2. What model should we train with Federated Learning? Section 3.3 compares different alternatives and proposes a Federated SVM framework.
Q3. What datasets should be used to train and test those classifiers? Our training dataset consists of HTTP packets sent by mobile devices, labeled appropriately for each prediction task, i.e., with binary labels to indicate PII exposure or Ad requests in each packet. Collection can be done using one of the existing VPN-based tools for intercepting traffic on the mobile device [19, 21] , and labeling can be done using DPI [16, 17, 28] , blacklists [25] or other tools [18] . Section 4 describes three real-world datasets we used in this paper.
Scope. Our focus in this paper is on adapting and evaluating the Federated Learning framework specifically for mobile packet classification. An overview of our pipeline is provided on Fig. 3 , and the rest of the section describes the details.
The following considerations are out of the scope of this paper and deferred to future work. First, as discussed in Section 2, there are known privacy attacks to Federated Learning, and proposed solutions (e.g., secure aggregation and differential privacy) that can be added on the basic framework and are not considered in this paper. Second, our classifiers are trained on features extracted from HTTP or decrypted HTTPS traffic. This is a reasonable assumption today that (1) large portion of traffic is still unencrypted and (ii) several VPN tools [19, 21] are able to successfully "man-ining the packet or obfuscating sensitive information, which is however, out of scope for this paper. 2 This approach allows to train on characteristics of real users, as it was the case e.g., in [16] . Alternatively, training data can be obtained by automatically testing mobile apps [20, 18, 17] , which may allow to explore app behavior more systematically. Both approaches are valuable, but in this paper, we focus on the former. Figure 3 : Overview of our pipeline for mobile packet classification. During training, the input is a packet trace with HTTP packets sent from mobile apps to remote destinations, labeled for the Task of interest (A: PII Exposure or B: Ad Request); the output is a per-app or a general machine learning model, which is trained in a local, centralized or federated way. During testing, the input is an HTTP packet, and the output is a binary label (indicating the presence or absence of PII or Ad request).
the-middle" and decrypt HTTPS traffic on the mobile device itself, which is reasonable for the user to trust. As traffic gets increasingly encrypted and certificate pinning is adopted by more Android apps, intercepting HTTPS traffic will be more difficult 3 and classifiers will have access only to network level features (e.g., IP/TCP headers, SNI, etc) rather than HTTP headers and payload. Federated Learning applies to that feature space as well, but this is out of scope for this paper. . This packet would be labeled positive both for PII exposure and for Ad request. Our HTTP Keys features are highlighted in bold: these keys are defined by the HTTP protocol and extracted from (1) the URI query keys (2) the Cookie keys and (3) custom HTTP headers (e.g., "Bitmoji-User-Agent"'). Compared to baselines (All Words, Recon Words), HTTP Keys do not use sensitive information such as "city_X".
HTTP Features
Feature extraction. We build on the approach introduced by Recon [16] and used in follow-up classifiers [17, 28, 18] : every HTTP packet is split into words by using delimiter characters; the resulting words include keys and values from all HTTP packet headers. Fig. 4 shows an example HTTP packet from Bitmoji (a mobile app that creates personal avatars), which sends several identifiers (Android Id, Advertiser Id and zip code) to an ad server. The question is which of these words to select as features to predict the presence of PII or Ad request in a packet, while facilitating Federated Learning, preserving privacy and meeting other constrains.
There are several challenges when defining this feature space. First, we need to consider the trade-off between privacy and classification performance. This implies that we may not use some words that can help accurately classify packets, if these features themselves expose sensitive information (e.g., part of URLs and domains can contain sensitive information about user's political views, medical conditions or sexual orientation); to that end we do not use any values as features, only keys. Second, the feature space must have a small size (for high training speed, low memory and computation overhead for updates) and be fixed and known to all participating devices in the Federated Learning. Taking these constraints into account, we consider three different feature spaces, two baselines and our proposed one:
Baselines: All Words vs. Recon Words [16, 17, 28, 18] . Instead of considering the union of all words as the feature space (All Words), Recon applied heuristics to remove the words that appear rarely and the most frequent words (stopwords, which correspond to standard HTTP headers, common values such as values parsed from the user_agent header). This results in removing some but not all values from consideration. In particular, Recon discards the values after the "=" delimiter, however certain values that do not follow this syntax will not be removed from the feature space and those might contain sensitive information. We refer to the remaining features as Recon Words. The URI path also contains potentially sensitive information and words from URI path are also included in Recon Words. Fig. 4 shows an example HTTP packet and a subset of the vocabulary of selected as Recon Words, which includes some sensitive values such as "city_X".
Our feature space: HTTP Keys. During Federated Learning, all mobile devices and the server need to agree on the model and features they use, and they exchange information about model parameters. Both the features themselves and the parameter updates can potentially contain sensitive information. To avoid that privacy risk, we purposely limit our feature space to use only non-sensitive keys from HTTP packets. More specifically, we consider the structure of HTTP packets and extract features from: (1) the URI query keys, (2) the Cookie keys, and (3) custom HTTP headers; and (4) whether or not there is a file request in the packet. We refer to the collection of these features as HTTP Keys.
First, consider the URI: it typically contains a relative path on a given domain and queries, usually built using key-value pairs separated by "&" characters. Sensitive information in the URI typically appears in relative paths and query values, while query keys represent API calls to the destination domain. We only use query keys as features. We do not extract any features from the domain and the URI path, since it may contain sensitive information about the user. Second, we include keys from the Cookie field. Query keys from these two fields are sufficient to extract features for most packets in our datasets.
Third, to differentiate more packets, we extract custom HTTP headers, which are defined by apps and can embed sensitive information about users. In recent years, apps have started using custom headers in order to provide app specific functionality. We remove the standard HTTP headers [89] from all HTTP headers in order to retrieve the custom ones.
Fourth, if a packet does not have any keys in the URI field, Cookie header or custom HTTP headers, we include file request-a boolean feature that indicates the presence of a file request. In most cases this will be a benign activity such as requesting static HTML content. Packets in the datasets that do not contain any of the four features, which we refer to as keyless, are excluded from our pipeline.
Feature Space Size. Considering HTTP Keys as features already reduces the feature space. However, the feature space size varies widely across apps and users. Different apps have different APIs (which may lead to different query keys and custom HTTP headers) and they may contact different destination domains. We differentiate between two broad categories of apps according to the number of contacted domains: apps with or without Webview. Webview apps can contact any domain and present web content in the Webview; examples include browsers or social media apps like Facebook. Apps without Webview are more likely to only contact a small fixed set of domains, such as backend servers, analytic and advertisement services. Apps with Webview present new challenges, since the feature space could explode with hundreds of features from every new user, who visits previously unseen domains. We discuss more about Webview apps and their impact on the feature space size in Section 4.
Vocabularies. Vocabularies are used in machine learning models with non-numerical features; in our case the vocabulary is the set of unique words in the dataset. Throughout this paper, we refer to vocabulary and feature space interchangeably. In this paper, we use Multi-hot encoding to represent the extracted words per packet. A Multi-hot encoding is a sparse binary vector with the length of the vocabulary such that it is has 1s at the locations of words in the vector; 0 otherwise. An example is shown at the bottom of Fig. 4 . We use the same feature space for both classification tasks (Ad request and PII exposure detection), because there is a relation between the two tasks: apps use PII information for serving ads.
In Federated Learning, the vocabulary must be fixed and shared a-priori between all mobile devices and the server. Recon Words potentially expose sensitive information during the construction of the shared feature space. Fixing a vocabulary across multiple users is successful when the feature space is fixed i.e., for apps without Webview. The intuition is that a single user might not explore the entire API of a service, but across multiple users this is more likely to happen.
Model Selection: Federated SVM
Once the feature space is fixed, our goal is to train a classifier using Federated Learning. The first step is to select the classification model, e.g., Decision Trees (DTs), Random Forest (RF), Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), Support Vector Machines (SVMs), etc. The next step is to train that model in a Federated way ( Fig. 1(c) ) and compare it to its Centralized ( Fig. 1(b) ) and Local versions ( Fig. 1(b) ). The choices we evaluate across these two dimensions (i.e., classification model and degree of collaboration among users) are summarized under "Model Training" on Fig. 3 .
Selecting SVMs as the Classification Model. State-ofthe-art classifiers for mobile packets have trained DTs [16, 28, 18 ] to predict PII exposure or Ad requests based on features extracted from outgoing HTTP packets. DTs were chosen primarily because of their interpretability for small tree sizes and their efficiency for on-device prediction [17, 28, 18] -most packets are classified after a few levels in the tree. Unfortunately, DTs do not naturally lend themselves to federation, since there is no framework for "aggregating" multiple decision trees collected from multiple devices at the server. In this paper, we use DTs as baseline centralized models.
Federated averaging was developed for models based on Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD), primarily DNNs [29, 30] . In SGD-based models, the mobiles and the server exchange gradient updates, and the server simply averages the local gradients to update the global model. Unfortunately, DNNs require a large number of samples to train, which is costly (in device resources and user experience) to obtain and train on mobile devices.
While Federated Learning is most commonly used to train DNNs, it applies to any SGD-based model that lends itself to aggregation at the server. In this paper, we select SVMs. Compared to DTs: SVMs are SGD-based -thus amenable Algorithm 1: Federated SVM Given K clients (indexed by k); B local minibatch size; E number of local epochs; R number of global rounds; C fraction of clients and η learning rate. Server executes:
to federation, achieve similar F1 score (due to the simple binary vector representation that comes from the multi-hot encoding) and interpretability (through weight coefficients). Compared to DNNs: (1) SVMs use fewer parameters which means less computation, communication and faster training; (2) Linear Kernel SVMs have convex loss functions where more principled guarantees can be provided for convergence during training; (3) SVMs usually perform better than DNNs on datasets with limited size; (4) SVMs are easier to interpret.
Federated SVM. In this paper, we use Federated SVM with linear kernels as the core of our federated packet classification. Linear kernel SVM minimizes the following objective function, f , over weight vector w:
where x i is the feature vector (i.e., the Multi-hot encoding for a packet), y i is the binary label and the loss function is called the Hinge loss: l(w, x, y) = max(0, 1 − y · (w · x)). Pegasos previously applied the SGD algorithm for SVM [90] . The Hinge loss function is convex and has the necessary subgradients, i.e., if y · w · x < 1, then l(w, x, y) = −y · x, otherwise 0. This step is easily added to the SGD algorithm, but more importantly to Federated Averaging [91] . Algorithm 1 shows our algorithm for Federated SVM: we apply the SVM-based gradient updates to the Federated Averaging algorithm from [91] . Federated SVM trains an SVM model distributively over K clients (corresponding to mobile devices), where C fraction of the clients update their model in each round and all clients update the global model by averaging their model parameters. A client update consists of multiple local epochs, E, and minibatch split of local data into B batches similar to standard SGD algorithm. Clients compute the SGD update based on the above Hinge loss.
The Federated SGD algorithm is a special case of Federated Averaging for C = 1, E = 1, B = ∞ [91] (i.e., use every client in a round with a single pass on all their local data once). Usually, we look to push more computation to the clients by setting E > 1 and B to a small number, and use a small fraction of clients C in each global round. [91] explores the trade-off between these hyper-parameters and shows how to decrease the global number of rounds R required to reach a target accuracy on the test sets for image classification and next word prediction. The Federated Learning framework trains a shared model, hence the feature space has to be fixed and shared across multiple users. The size of feature space affects parameter updates, and thus communication costs during model training.
Federated vs. Centralized and Local models. Once we have fixed the feature space and underlying model (SVM with linear kernel), we compare the Federated vs. Centralized and Local models, as shown in overview depicted in Fig. 1 .
• Local models are trained on data available on each device, similar to previous works [16, 17, 28, 18] . Nothing is shared outside the devices, thus preserving privacy but not classification performance.
• Centralized models: devices upload their training data to a server, and a global model is trained at the central server, similar to previous works of AntShield [28, 17] , Recon [16] and NoMoAds [18] . This approach trains better classifiers but shares potentially sensitive training data.
• Federated models: devices do not share training data with the server, but send model parameter updates to the server, which then aggregates, updates the global model and pushes it to all devices; the process repeats until convergence.
DATASETS DESCRIPTION
We use three real-world datasets, summarized on Table 1 , to evaluate the performance of our federated approach, w.r.t. two packet classification tasks, i.e., PII exposures and Ad requests.
NoMoAds dataset [18, 31] . The NoMoAds dataset is made publicly available at [31] by the authors of [18] . It consists of HTTP and unencrypted HTTPS packets, labeled with ad requests and PII exposures they may contain, from 50 most popular apps in the Google Play Store. The data was generated via manual testing (interacting with each app for five minutes) with test accounts and there were no human subjects involved. The data was labeled by using state-of-theart filterlists [25] of ad serving domains initially and then if an ad was still appearing during manual testing, a rule was produced manually via visual inspection to detect ads in the last few packets. NoMoAds is the only dataset that contains state-of-the-art labels for advertising.
AntShield dataset [28, 17, 32] . The AntShield dataset is made publicly available at [32] by the authors of [28, 17] it is similar to NoMoAds dataset but it is richer since it contains data from more apps for the PII task. The data was generated with manual and automated testing. The manual tests included interacting for five minutes with the top 100 most popular apps (according to AppAnnie [92] ). The automated tests included top 400 apps and a monkey script [93] was performing 1,000 random actions over ten minutes per app. We combine the AntShield data generated from manual and automated testing to a single dataset, from which we consider the 297 apps out of 400, that generated HTTP or HTTPS traffic. We would like to note that there are other publicly available datasets with PII labels, i.e., extended dataset with many apps and their different versions during 8 years [41] , however this dataset does not include logs from all HTTP fields packets and it would be impossible to extract our chosen features from URI and Cookie fields and the presence of custom headers. Another publicly available dataset is [94] with labeled HTTP packets. However, the mapping of packets to the app that generated it, is not reliable and since we sample the data per app in order to create synthetic users, we decided to use the AntShield dataset as an example dataset for PII task.
In-house Datasets with real users. This is a dataset we collected in-house from 10 real users who contributed their packet traces for a period of 7 months 4 . The packet traces were collected by running Antmonitor [22] : an open-source VPN-based tool that intercepts outgoing network traffic generated from each Android app. In order to run our machine learning algorithms, we have preprocessed the raw packet traces into JSON, by keeping only HTTP packet-level information. We redacted all user sensitive information with a prefix and the type of PII it contained (e.g., prefix_email) and labeled the packets with exposures if they contained one of these scrubbed PII exposures. To evaluate Federated Learning, we consider the two most popular apps across all ten users, which are Chrome and Facebook with 8 and 10 users in total respectively. We consider each of these two apps as a separate dataset: in-house Chrome and in-house Facebook.
Packet Classification Tasks. In all three datasets, a packet is considered to have a PII exposure, if it contains some personally identifiable information (PII), including the follow-ing: (i) device identifiers, such as IMEI, Device ID, phone number, serial number, ICCID, MAC Address; (ii) user identifiers such as first/last name, Advertiser ID, email, phone number; (iii) Location: latitude and longitude coordinates, city, zip code. This is a subset of PII as defined in prior work, but our framework can be used to detect additional PII types if the corresponding labeled ground truth is provided. If a packet contains at least one of these sensitive fields, we assign label 1 to the packet, otherwise 0. For the ad prediction task, if a packet contains an Ad Request it is labeled as 1, otherwise 0. These labels are available for each packet in the datasets considered.
Summary of the Datasets. Table 1 summarizes the feature space, as relevant to our federated learning framework, including: total number of unique features (URI keys, Cookie keys and custom HTTP headers), total number of packets, total keyless packets and how many of them were POST requests, total packets that contain a file request only but no other feature, and unique destination domains.We do not include HTTP POST packets in our training or testing, for keyless packets, i.e., packets without any features (query keys in the URI or Cookie field, custom HTTP headers, or file request). There is no standardized syntax for the POST body in order to obtain only the keys without parsing the values too. Therefore, for privacy reasons we decided to not parse them at all and to discard such packets from our experiments.
The AntShield dataset contains the most apps and packets with a PII exposure (8, 170) , while in-house Chrome contains the most packets (84, 716 ) and the highest number of unique domains (1, 607 This explosion of feature space affects the training speed, the size of the trained models and might expose sensitive information of user data (i.e., values to sensitive keys). The benefit of our HTTP Keys approach is the following: (1) our significantly reduced feature space can describe both prediction tasks (Ads and PII), (2) users share limited sensitive in- formation, without sacrificing classification accuracy and (3) the reduced number of features leads to smaller models and faster training, which is important in mobile environments. Webview vs. non-Webview apps. Figure. 5 shows the distribution of features and domains for the top 12 apps with most features from our in-house dataset. There is a positive correlation between the number of features and visited domains for each app. Webview apps, such as Facebook and Chrome, have the most features, as expected. Table 2 shows the feature space for Chrome and Facebook in all our datasets. The feature space of Webview apps depends on the usage of each app, e.g., the duration (in terms of packets), user behavior (in terms of domains visited). We observe the explosion of the feature space in our in-house dataset, where Chrome has only 370 shared features across 8 users, but the union has 11,212. Similarly, the Facebook app has only 14 common out of 5,550 features across 10 users. In contrast, non-Webview apps have smaller feature spaces due to their limited number of contacted domains. In this paper, we assume that the datasets contain all possible visited domains and the feature set is fixed.
RESULTS
General Setup. where the test data comes either from a user or is the union of test data from all users. We train only general and perapp models, but no per-domain model (as there can be too many domains and it would be impractical to train a separate model for each). In each scenario, we describe the evaluation setup, rationale and results in terms of classification accuracy, communication and computation cost.
To evaluate the classification performance, we split the available data into 80% train and 20% test data in order to compute F1 score [95] on the positive class (i.e., Ad request or PII exposure is detected). Furthermore, in each of the experiment scenarios, we apply standard machine learning techniques to train efficient classifiers. Before training, we balance our dataset so that it contains an even amount of positive and negative examples to avoid training with a bias towards the most frequent class. For each of the following experiments we train and test five times each model (unless otherwise mentioned) to obtain an average F1 score.
Creating synthetic users. NoMoAds and AntShield datasets do not come from real users, since they were produced manually by their corresponding authors or automatically via running monkey scripts with random actions. We create synthetic users by sampling from the available data in order to test our Federated approach for packet classification. We developed two different approaches to partition the data into k synthetic users: a random split into equal amounts of data (even split) and a random split of data with random sizes of sampled data so that each user contains a different amount of packets (uneven split). For the uneven split, we used a minimum threshold, 30%, of available app data to be assigned to each user. We test both methods and show their results, since the advantage of Federated Learning is that it can handle various distributions of data across participating users.
For both synthetic and real users, we apply the train and test split per user to train Local, Centralized or Federated classifiers. In addition, we show in Section 5.4, that training on a subset of users can provide good classifiers for all users. Adding the file request feature includes more packets which results in a classification loss of approximately 8% and 3% for Ads and PII prediction accordingly. The drop in performance is slightly larger in case of Ad predictions, since our feature space does not include information about domains that is important for this task as shown in [18] . Prior work [16, 17, 28, 18] uses domain information in addition to other potentially sensitive features, and achieves higher F1 score. There is always a trade-off between privacy and utility, however, our defined feature space and the distributed framework are good steps towards private packet classification, without significant loss in classification performance.
Results 1b: SVM with SGD performs similarly to Decision Trees. We compare SVM with SGD to state-of-theart baseline models, such as Decision Trees and Random Forest (used in AntShield [17] , Recon [16] , NoMoAds [18] ). Table 4 compares their performance on the NoMoAds dataset. For all feature spaces (i) the linear SVM and SVM with SGD perform similarly to Decision Tree and Random Forest; and (ii) SVM with a non-linear kernel (rbf) seems to not generalize well and it is likely to overfit to data. Therefore, we select SVM with SGD as the basis of our Federated Learning framework.
Scenario 2: NoMoAds for PII, Ad Request
Setup 2a. We use the following setup from Table 3 . Dataset: NoMoAds.Users: Even and Uneven split across 5 synthetic users; the distribution of data for uneven split is depicted on Fig.6 . Classifier Granularity: General. Models: Federated SVM vs. Centralized SVM. Tasks: PII exposure and Ad request. We set local epochs to E = 5, batch size to B = 10 and we use all users by setting the fraction C = 1.0, as we use only 5 synthetic users due to the limited size of the dataset.
Results 2a: Federated vs. Centralized vs. Local. Table 5 shows the classification performance (F1 score), where the Federated model performs as well as the Centralized model and significantly outperforms the Local models. In particular, Federated training performs similarly to the same model trained in Centralized way on the union of all users' data. Moreover, the F1 score of the Federated model on each individual user's test data is slightly higher than their Local models, especially for the uneven split. For uneven split, the average number of rounds required to reach such F1 score for the Ads prediction is 8.8, while for PII prediction 1 round was sufficient to reach F1 score = 0.96. For even split, the average number of rounds required to reach such F1 score is 2.6 for the Ads prediction and 2.2 rounds for the PII prediction.
Setup 2b. This is similar to Setup 2a, but the data is split into 20, instead of 5, synthetic users. For B = ∞, we use all available data without any minibatches, similarly to [29] . We require all models to reach a target F1 score on test set (0.85 and 0.95 for Ads and PII predictions respectively); we select these F1 score targets to match the performance of Centralized models shown in Table 4 for each task.
Results 2b: Impact of Federated parameters. Table 6 shows how the average number of rounds (R), until the models reach the target F1 score, depends on the fraction of participating clients (C), a different batch size (B) and local epochs (E). A general trend is that increasing the C parameter, the average number of rounds decreases significantly and the gap between min and max decreases. Moreover, increasing the batch size decreases the number of rounds, as small batch size helps the model to converge faster. These observations apply to both uneven and even splits and to both prediction tasks. On the other hand, increasing the local epochs and pushing computation to users increases the number of rounds, except for the case when C = 1.0. The reason for this is that our model is simple and more local epochs lead to overfitting. The main parameter that significantly affects the number of communication rounds is C. This is expected and the effects of C can be understood in the following way: using fewer clients in a round requires less communication per round, but similar amount of computation is required to train our models, hence the increased number of rounds. However, in the context of mobile packet classification, the number of rounds is much lower than observed for more complex models in related work [91] and remains around 10 for C = 0.2.
Scenario 3: AntShield for PII Prediction
Setup 3. We use the following setup from Table 3 . Dataset: AntShield. Users: Even vs. Uneven split with 5 synthetic users. Classifier Granularity: General. Models: Federated SVM vs. Centralized SVM, Tasks: PII exposure. We set B = 10, E = 5, C = 1.0, similarly to Setup 2.
Results 3. tested on the union of user test sets, while the corresponding Centralized model has an F1 score = 0.96, achieved within 5.8 rounds on average. For the uneven split of data among users, the Federated model achieves the same F1 score = 0.94, but slightly slower (in 6.6 rounds). We observe that some users achieve lower F1 score on their corresponding Local models, which is expected as these users have much less data and especially positive examples, because of the skewness of data in the uneven split. In summary, we show that even with a different dataset, our Federated approach still performs well when compared to its corresponding Centralized model for both types of splits, with a small difference in communication rounds to achieve the same F1 score.
Scenario 4: In-house Datasets for PII Prediction
Setup 4. We use the following setup from Table 3 : Dataset: In-house Chrome, Facebook. Users: 10 real users. Classifier Granularity: Per App. Models: Federated SVM vs. Centralized SVM. Tasks: PII exposure. The goal is to evaluate our Federated framework (1) on real user activity (instead of systematic tests of apps) and (2) over a longer time period (7 months instead of five/ten minutes). Figure 7 shows the dis- tribution of Chrome and Facebook packets (including labels) present across the 10 real users in our in-house dataset.
Results 4a. Results 4b. In Table 9 , we evaluate the impact of batch Table 7 : Results 3. AntShield dataset for predicting PII exposures, for 5 synthetic users created with uneven and even split of data. The F1 score is averaged from 5 runs for C = 1.0, B = 10, E = 5. We report the average F1 score and the number of rounds, R (avg [min, max]) required to achieve that F1 score. We set C = 0.5, B = 10, E = 5.
size (B) and local epochs (E) on the communication rounds required to achieve a target F1 score for Chrome and Facebook. We run each experiment five times in order to obtain the average number of rounds required and the min, max values. We observe that increasing the batch size increases slightly the average number of rounds to achieve the target F1 score, while increasing the E parameter increases the number of rounds significantly. The reason is that we use a simple model and most likely the model overfits with large epoch values. In the original Federated Learning paper [29] , the authors showed the opposite effect: increasing the local epochs decreases the number of rounds; however, they train DNNs that require more complexity and do not overfit for those E values. Moreover, we observe that the batch size (B) does not significantly affect the number of rounds re- Table 9 : Results 4b. We report the average [minimum, maximum] number of communication rounds (R) required to achieve a target F1 score of 0.94 and 0.84 for Facebook and Chrome, respectively. We vary the parameters batch size (B) and number of local epochs (E) to evaluate their impact on the average number of rounds, with fixed C = 0.5. If the target F1 score is not reached within 800 rounds for none of the 5 runs, we assume that it does not converge.
quired. However, the number of local epochs (E) plays an important role in the model's convergence, which we further explore next.
Results 4c: Convergence of Federated models. Figure 8 shows the performance of Federated SVM for Facebook and Chrome when we vary the local epochs, E. We set the fraction of client C = 0.5 and batch size B = 10. We train each model with an E value five times and report the average and standard deviation (in shadowed color). The main difference between the two apps is that the F1 score of the Federated model is closer to the Centralized one for Facebook. However, the standard deviation is much larger than Chrome's. In addition, E = 1 for Chrome can reach a better F1 score = 0.89 than in the previous experiments, because of the lower E value. We observe that the Federated model is more sensitive to the E parameter, which leads to overfitting for SVM.
Results 4d: Benefit of Crowdsourcing. We ask the question: how many users need to collaborate in training a global model in order to get most of the predictive power? Figure  9 shows that a few users participating in the training phase during Federated learning can be beneficial for all users. We show the maximum average F1 score obtained from five runs, as a function of the number of users (k) participating in training. The F1 score is evaluated both on all user's test data and on the test data of k users who participated in the training. We sort the users by increasing amount of training data. For example, when k = 1, one user with the fewest data points participates in training. When k = 2, in addition to the previous user, another user with more data is used during training. More users in the training phase is beneficial to increase the F1 score for both apps. However, there are some users who do not help with their data and slightly worsen the F1 score, as their data might confuse the classifier. For Facebook, we need to add at least 3 users in order to obtain a decent F1 score, while Chrome reaches the same F1 score with only 2 users. The F1 score on the test data of k users is much higher than on the union of all users' test data, as the models only fit to the data available for the participating users. The lack of generalization is one of the reasons that Webview apps are a challenging special case in the mobile packet classification problem. However, both Chrome and Facebook train Federated models that generalize well with F1 score of over 0.80, if enough users with useful (diverse) data participate in training.
Scenario 5: Interpreting SVM vs. DT
Setup 5. We use the following setup from observing the most important coefficients in SVM, (2) by knowledge transfer from SVM to DT. The goal here is to compare SVM to DT in terms of their interpretability. Results 5. Figure 10 presents the ten most important negative and positive coefficients and their corresponding features for our Centralized SVM model. In order to distinguish important features, we use the model's coefficients, where the positive ones correspond to the features whose presence leads to positive labels and the negative coefficients correspond to features responsible for predicting label 0 (e.g., No PII detected). This is not a one-to-one mapping of important features between SVM and DT due to their internal representation of features. However, we observe certain keys that are responsible for PII exposures such as "gaid", that also appear in the corresponding Decision Tree. Figure 11 (b) shows the DT after knowledge transfer from SVM. To perform knowledge transfer from SVM to DT, we first split the data into 40% for training SVM, another 40% for training a DT, which is labeled with predictions from the aforementioned SVM. The remaining 20% of the data is used for testing. This is one way to leverage the interpretability of Decision Trees via knowledge transfer from SVM. In Fig. 11(a) , we show a Decision Tree which was trained with NoMoAds for PII prediction, while in Fig. 11(b) , we show the DT after knowledge transfer from SVM. We observe that both DTs, at least at the top levels, have similar important features and thus, capture similar patterns. The original DT and SVM reached F1 score = 0.95 and the after knowledge transfer DT reached F1 score = 0.94 on the same test data. This is only a minor F1 score loss during knowledge transfer.
The most notable difference between the trees in Fig. 11 is the lack of a large branch that only predicts label 0, which is the result of how the original tree unsuccessfully attempts to separate data. However, the DT after the knowledge transfer is oblivious to this error, since the SVM most likely suffers from the same issue as the original DT. Such errors propagating from the SVM make the DT after the knowledge transfer smaller (269 vs. 141 nodes) than the original DT.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Summary. This paper proposes, for the first time, a Federated Learning framework for Mobile Packet Classification, and evaluates its effectiveness and efficiency, using three real-world datasets and two different tasks (namely PII exposure and Ad request). First, we proposed a reduced feature space (HTTP Keys), which limits the sensitive information shared by users. Then, we showed that SVM with SGD performs similarly to Decision Trees used by state-of-the-art [16, 17, 28] , in terms of F1 score as well as interpretability. We also showed that Federated achieves a significantly higher F1 score than Local and is comparable to Centralized models, and it does so within a few communication rounds and with minimal computation per user, which is important in the mobile environment.
Future work. There are several directions for future work. First, we plan to study the exploding feature space of Webview apps due to temporal and user dynamics. Second, we will seek to evaluate our framework in larger datasets, which would also allows us to train and evaluate DNNs. Third, we will explore ways to handle encrypted traffic (e.g., by focusing on network features, SNI, domain embeddings, etc). Fourth, we will consider well-known privacy attacks to Federated Learning (model parameter updates can still contain sensitive information) and mechanisms (Secure Aggregation [96] or Differential Privacy [82] ) that can be added on top of Federated Learning, which were considered out of scope for this paper. In future work, we are interested in optimizing the design of such mechanisms specifically for the mobile classification problem. Fifth, we will leverage knowledge transfer from SVMs to deploy DT classifiers on mobile, which have been previously implemented efficiently on the device [17] , thanks to the simple DT rules. Related to that, we plan to implement our method directly on mobile phones and possibly leverage the recently announced open source framework for Federated Learning, TensorFlow Federated [97], which can be done on top of open source VPN tools [17, 18] . A mobile implementation would provide us with evaluation on real-world resource consumption. Finally, our general framework can be applied towards other packet classification tasks, beyond PII and Ad prediction, such as e.g., fingerprinting, provided there are labeled packet traces to train on. 
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